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Abstract
This paper examines the importance of the ability of high-educated
individuals for the growth rate. I consider two sources of heterogene-
ity among individuals: ability and consumption value of education.
The latter is assumed to depend on family background and will thus
generate diﬀerent ability thresholds to enroll in higher education for
diﬀerent family background types. If the eﬀect of high-educated indi-
viduals on the growth rate depends on their ability, this will aﬀect the
willingness of low-educated individuals to contribute to the funding of
higher education. Whether state funded subsidies to higher education
beneﬁt some of the low-educated individuals or even are Pareto im-
proving is shown to depend on the switchers’ ability and hence, their
inﬂuence on the growth rate.
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Subsidizing higher education through state funding redistributes resources
from low-educated individuals to high-educated individuals. Since the edu-
cation level is highly correlated with the individuals’ earnings in the labor
market, this redistribution can also be regarded as going from low-income
individuals towards high-income individuals. Yet, higher education is widely
subzidized throughout the whole Western world. Since this hardly reﬂects a
public desire to widen the income distribution, more plausible explanations
have been advanced.
Johnson (1984) and Dur and Teulings (2003) argue that education sub-
sidies boost the share of educated individuals which, in turn, decreases their
wage rate and increases the wage rate of the unskilled individuals, if there
is complementarity between skills in the production process. If the wage
compression is suﬃciently large, unskilled individuals may beneﬁt from con-
tributing to ﬁnancing the subsidies. Brevia and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2002)
oﬀer another explanation. They argue that education subsidies broaden the
future tax base and thus, enable a larger redistribution to unskilled individ-
uals. Creedy and Francois (1990) use an endogenous growth framework and
show that if the eﬀect of the number of educated individuals on growth is
suﬃciently large, unskilled individuals may beneﬁt from an introduction of
education subsidies. The reason for this is that this growth externality is
assumed to increase the wage rate of everyone.
Based on empirical evidence presented in the next section, this paper
further develops the idea of Creedy and Francois (1990) by adding two im-
portant dimensions described in the following.
First, the paper acknowledges that the education decision is not only
based on pecuniary aspects but also involves a consumption motive, which
is ”the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a new
city, and participating in campus and student activities, in addition to the
increased status in the society that often comes from being a student of
2particular ﬁelds” (Aalstadsaeter, 2004)1. Moreover, the consumption value
is assumed to be higher for individuals with a high socioeconomic background
than for those from less fortunate home environments.
Second, it is assumed that the eﬀect of high-educated individuals on the
growth rate depends on their ability. Among the educated individuals, high-
ability individuals are assumed to aﬀect the growth rate more than low-ability
individuals. This assumption could be compared to the more general case
where also low-educated individuals with a high ability aﬀect the growth rate,
but at a lower rate than if they had been educated. My way of modeling
normalizes low-educated individuals’ eﬀect on the growth rate to zero, since
the paper focuses on the role of higher education.
In Creedy and Francois (1990), the diﬀerent eﬀect on the growth rate of
individuals with diﬀerent abilities is just an uncommented implicit feature
of the chosen growth function. The same mechanism also exists in other
papers. For example, in Galor and Moav (2000) the contribution to the
human capital stock of an individual is determined by her ability and this
stock drives the technological progress. Another example is Fershtman et
al. (1996). They develop a model where rich low-ability individuals crowd
out less wealthy high-ability individuals from growth-enhancing industries,
which has a negative eﬀect on the growth rate.2
With the two above assumptions, the model adds a relevant complexity
to the decision of subsidizing higher education. The idea is simple. The
1The consumption value of education was historically considered to be the main mo-
tivation for education, before Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964) introduced the human
capital theory. In later decades, the common view is that the education decision is prob-
ably a combination of pecuniary and nonpecuniary motives; see Aalstadsaeter (2004) for
an overview.
2As in these papers, I abstract from the speciﬁc mechanism through which high-
educated individuals aﬀect the growth rate more than low-educated individuals. It could
be the case that more educated people arguably have a larger chance of generating new
ideas, the ideas generated are more productivity enhancing, these people learn faster to
apply other peoples’ innovations etc; see Bartel and Lichtenberg (1988) and Jamison and
Lau (1982) for reviews of these ideas.
3heterogeneity of the consumption value of education implies that the ability
threshold for enrolling in higher education will be lower for individuals from
a high socioeconomic background than for those from a low socioeconomic
background. Thus, the individuals of each type that switch to education
as a response to the introduction of a subsidy will be of diﬀerent abilities.
According to the second assumption, they will therefore also have diﬀerent
eﬀects on the growth rate. Hence, whether unskilled individuals beneﬁt from
contributing to the ﬁnancing of the education subsidies does not only depend
on the number of new students the subsidy attracts but also on the switcher’s
ability. I show the condition for when the growth externality is suﬃciently
large to beneﬁt some of the low-educated individuals and when it is even
Pareto improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I
present empirical evidence supporting the main assumptions of the paper.
In Section 3, a model inspired by Creedy and Francois (1990) and Haupt
(2004) is introduced. There is only one time period, which the individuals
can use either to work as low-skilled workers or to obtain an education and
thereby increase their productivity and thus work as high-skilled workers.
The government can tax labor income to ﬁnance the education subsidy. The
economy’s growth rate increases with the share of educated individuals above
a certain ability threshold3. In Section 4, I assess under which circumstances
an education subsidy beneﬁts some of the low-educated individuals and the
requirement for it to be Pareto improving. The ﬁfth section concludes and
oﬀers some ﬁnal remarks.
3Ideally, the growth rate should be positively aﬀected by all educated individuals, but
more by those with higher ability. However, my way of modelling is simpler and does not
aﬀect the main conclusions.
42 Empirical evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on the main assumptions of the
paper. The ﬁrst part presents evidence suggesting that the consumption
value of education is higher for individuals from a high socioeconomic back-
ground than for those from a low socioeconomic background. The second
part presents evidence on the size of the growth externality, and also on the
importance of the composition as regards the ability of those individuals who
choose to enroll in higher education.
2.1 Consumption value of education and family back-
ground
Bowles (1972) argues that there is considerable evidence that rich, high sta-
tus parents place a larger value on the non-pecuniary aspects of work and a
lower value on monetary returns than poorer, lower status parents. Oster-
beek and Ophem (2000) ﬁnd support for this view stating that the consump-
tion motive for education is higher for individuals with a high socioeconomic
background. Eriksson and Jonsson (1994) ﬁnd that a considerable part of
the enrollment gap for Swedish children from diﬀerent family backgrounds
persists when they control for school grades. All these studies suggest that
the consumption motive is indeed higher for individuals from higher socioe-
conomic backgrounds.
2.2 Higher education and growth
The empirical evidence on the eﬀect of higher education on growth has mainly
focused on the quantity of higher education. The paper of Creedy and Fran-
cois (1990) described above relies on results found by Denison (1984), Schultz
(1981), Psacharopoulos (1973) and other papers on the eﬀect of higher ed-
ucation on growth. These studies typically ﬁnd a signiﬁcant but relatively
5small importance of higher education. Later studies ﬁnd rather mixed results.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) ﬁnd that a 0.09 year increase in average male
tertiary education raises growth by as much as 0.5 percent. Female tertiary
education has no eﬀect on growth, however. This latter result is conﬁrmed
in Barro (2001). An interesting result in Gemmell (1996) is that primary
and secondary education are especially important for growth in developing
countries and that tertiary education is especially important in developed
countries. In a review of the empirical literature on education and growth,
Gemmell (1997) summarizes that higher education indeed seems to be the
most relevant education variable in more developed countries. However, ac-
cording to him, evidence for higher education remains limited; recent results
are more encouraging than what is suggested by earlier studies but the ro-
bustness of these results is uncertain.
Much of the focus on the relationship between education and growth,
however, has switched from the quantity of education to the eﬀect of the
quality of education on growth. In the following, empirical evidence is pre-
sented showing labor-force quality to be highly signiﬁcant for growth. I also
argue that this relation gives support to my assumption that high-educated
individuals’ eﬀect on the growth rate depends on their ability.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) construct measures of schooling quality
based on student cognitive performance on international mathematics and
science tests in elementary and secondary school and use these measures as
proxies for labor-force quality. Their results indicate labor-force quality to be
strongly related to growth. That result also emerges with diﬀerent measure-
ments of labor-force quality and diﬀerent sets of control variables. Moreover,
robustness tests show this to be a causal relationship; labor-force quality af-
fects growth rather than vice versa. Similar results are found in Barro (2001).
He uses test scores on science, mathematics and reading as proxies for labor-
force quality and ﬁnds that all these test scores are generally positive and
signiﬁcant for growth, in particular those for science. Another interesting
6result in his study is that in speciﬁcations with both quantity and quality
variables, quantity is still signiﬁcant for men but the eﬀect of quality is much
more important. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in science
scores increases the growth rate by 1.0 percent per year. An equally large
increase in the school attainment variable, measuring quantity, increases the
growth rate by only 0.2 percent per year.
The studies mentioned above use average test scores as proxies for the
average labor-force quality. Hence, it is possible that only the average labor-
force quality is important for growth. Then, it would not be of any impor-
tance which individuals in the ability distribution choose to engage in higher
education, since high-ability people would aﬀect the growth rate indepen-
dently of whether they work in occupations demanding higher education.
However, this is not a plausible argument. If labor-force quality is important
for growth, as is strongly suggested by the evidence, it is arguably of great
importance to have high-ability people in the most qualiﬁed occupations,
where they can make use of the maximum of their potential.
To highlight the analogue with my model, assume there to be one low-
ability individual with a high consumption value of education and a high-
ability individual with a low consumption value. The low-ability individual
chooses to enroll in higher education due to her high consumption value and
ends up as an engineer. The high-ability person, on the other hand, chooses
not to engage in higher education and ends up working as a carpenter. It
is hard to believe that the high-ability individual would materialize growth
externalities as a carpenter to the same extent as she would if working as an
engineer, where the returns to innovations and new ideas are arguably much
higher.
This line of reasoning is supported by the endogenous growth literature,
e.g. Romer (1990), where the importance of research and development as
the engine of growth is emphasized. Hanushek (2003) also supports the
importance of having high-ability individuals engaged in higher education
7to foster economic growth. He advances the idea that the large number of
foreign high-ability students who enroll in U.S. colleges could be one reason
why rather modest U.S. test scores in elementary and secondary education
have not yet materialized in low growth rates.
The ability argument enhanced in this paper also bears signiﬁcant con-
nections to education expansions in the twentieth century. In Sweden, for
example, a major school reform was introduced in the 1950s with the very
aim of broadening the enrollment in education to also include gifted indi-
viduals from less fortunate home environments. Meghir and Palme (2005)
ﬁnd that the reform increased the educational attainment of those with low-
skilled parents. Moreover, education also increased signiﬁcantly beyond the
compulsory level for this group, which was made possible by improving the
ﬁnancial support for these families. Naturally, it is beyond the bounds of
this paper to assess if this human capital boost played any signiﬁcant role in
the strong Swedish growth track in the following decade, but it is indeed a
possibility that would be interesting to explore.
3 The Model
Consider an economy where individuals are born and raised by either low-
skilled or high-skilled parents. The total population is normalized to one. Let
the group of individuals with low-skilled parents be denoted by L and have
the share αL. Those with high-skilled parents are denoted H and have the
share αH. The individuals in each group are uniformly distributed according
to ability Xj, j = H,L, with support [X,X] for both groups, where X−X =
1 for computational convenience.
The model only involves one time period. At the beginning of the period,
individuals choose whether to enroll in higher education, which is assumed
not to be time consuming. After the education decision has been made, all
individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor. The individuals’ wage rate
8depends on their innate ability, but also on the growth rate in the economy
and whether they choose to get an education. Education is assumed to
increase individual productivity by a factor k > 0. In addition, education
has a positive growth spillover eﬀect g that is assumed to equally increase
everyone’s productivity.4 In sum, the wage rate is assumed to be wl = X(1+
g) for individuals choosing not to get an education and wh = X(1 + g + k)
for those choosing to get one, irrespective of the type of individuals.5 Note
that the notation of the preﬁxes implies that a capital letter denotes the
family background of the individual, and a small letter denotes the type the
individual chooses to become.
The education cost is ﬁxed at an amount R. The government subsidizes
a share s ∈ [0,1] of it, so that the individuals’ cost is R(1−s). The subsidy is
ﬁnanced through a lump-sum tax, t6. For simplicity, I impose the restriction
that t is considerably smaller than X, so that all individuals can aﬀord the
tax. Thus, there is no need to introduce a capital market. Education also
brings a consumption value θj, where θH > θL and θH > 0. θj is the imputed
value of education, that is, the equivalent income that the individuals are
willing to give up in order to get an education if there is no pay-oﬀ in the
form of an increased wage rate in the labor market7.
4It might seem strange to include a growth rate in a static model. However, it might
be viewed as the discounted value of wage increments due to higher growth. A similar
setup is used in Creedy and Francois (1990).
5In this setting, g and k are perfect complements. A more general way of modelling
would be to let this wage rate be wh = X(1 + g)(1 + k). However, the setup is chosen for
computational convenience and is a very good approximation of the general case as long
as g and k are small.
6Lump-sum taxes make the computations much easier and analytical solutions can
be achieved without changing the main conclusions. Moreover, if the focus is on the
conﬂict between non-educated and educated individuals, as is the case in this paper, it is
logical to have lump-sum transfers. With proportional taxes, there is an additional conﬂict
within these groups since in this case, high-productivity individuals contribute more to
the government’s revenues than low-productivity individuals. There is a discussion on this
matter in Haupt (2004).
7Similar ways of modelling are used in the literature; see, for example, Alstadsaeter et
al. (2005) and Haupt (2004). The advantage of my way of modelling is that the utility
9The growth rate of the economy g is described in section 3.2. In sum, con-
sumption for an educated j-type is
C
h
j = X(1 + k + g) − t + θj − (1 − s)R (3.1)
and no education implies consumption
C
l = X(1 + g) − t (3.2)
Consumption is the only argument in the individuals’ utility function
U = U(C), U
0
> 0 (3.3)
Assuming interior solutions,8 there must exist indiﬀerent individuals such
that
xj =
(1 − s)R − θj
k
(3.4)
and since θH > θL, it follows that xH < xL. Since productivity is uniformly
function only depends on one argument, that is consumption.
8Throughout the paper, only interior solutions are considered, in order to overcome
complex computations of unrealistic corner solutions.
10distributed among the individuals, these thresholds relate to the shares of
unskilled and skilled individuals within each group. In particular, let the
share λj indicate the share of skilled individuals within the group, where
λH =
Xk − (1 − s)R + θH
k
>
Xk − (1 − s)R + θL
k
= λL (3.5)
Consequently, 1 − λj is the share of unskilled workers in group j.
3.1 The subsidy s
Next, we turn to the government’s budget constraint B. Let E be the mass
of educated individuals. Assuming that all tax revenues are used to ﬁnance
the subsidy, it follows that B = t−sRE = 0 for the budget constraint to hold.
E = αHλH + αLλL (3.6)
and using that αL = 1−αH and rearranging, the budget constraint can now
be written







As can be seen from equations (3.4-7), there are interdependencies among the
tax rate, the subsidy and the enrollment mass E. A higher tax rate enables a
11higher subsidy rate. This, in turn, attracts more people to education, which
decreases the subsidy per person. Treating the tax rate as exogenous and
the subsidy and enrollment mass as endogenous variables, the relationship
between the subsidy rate and the tax rate can now be traced. This is done by
plugging the expression for λL in equation (3.5) into equation (3.7). Then, an







β2 + 4tk − β
￿
(3.8)
where β = αH(θH−θL)+Xk+θL−R, which is proportional to the enrollment
mass in laissez-faire. β > 09 and s = 0 when t = 0. Thus, the negative root





β2 + 4tk − β
￿
(3.9)
As should be expected, ds
dt > 0. Furthermore, d2s
dt2 < 0. This last result is
worth commenting. When the tax is increased, the government revenues
increase and it can therefore aﬀord higher subsidies which, in turn, will at-
tract more students to enroll in higher education. These subsidies, however,
are also increased for those who choose to get an education also ex ante
the policy change. This means that as the tax increases and the number of
educated individuals increases, the additional government revenues must be
split among a larger number of individuals; hence the negative sign on the
second derivative. This will aﬀect the possibility that unskilled individuals
9αH(θH − θL) ≥ 0. Thus, β > 0 if Xk + θL > R. In laissez-faire, equation (3.4) reads
xj =
R−θj
k . Since only interior solutions are considered, xj ∈ (X,X) ⇒ Xk < R − θj <
Xk ⇒ Xk + θL > R.
12may indirectly beneﬁt from subsidies through the growth externality, since
increasing subsidies will attract a continuously decreasing number of new









dt2. By inspection of
equation (3.4), dx
ds is just a negative constant, which implies that d2x
ds2 = 0.
Since d2s
dt2 < 0, the whole expression is positive; that is, as t increases, the
decrease in the cutoﬀ values is smaller and smaller.
3.2 The growth rate g
As explained in the introduction, I will assume that all educated individuals
do not contribute equally to the growth rate but that the more able indi-
viduals contribute more. For simplicity, let there be a threshold ability level
ˆ X such that individuals with X > ˆ X contribute equally to the growth rate
and those with X < ˆ X do not aﬀect the growth rate at all. g should now
be a linear10 function of the share of individuals above ˆ X who are educated,
M. This is crucial. If the eﬀect on growth only depends on innate ability,
government policy cannot aﬀect the growth rate. The share of educated in-




αj(X − xj) +
X
j={j|xj< ˆ X}
αj(X − ˆ X) (3.10)
Note that this speciﬁcation takes into account whether the threshold ability
of group j, xj, is below or above the growth aﬀecting threshold ˆ X. g can
now be written
10If all individuals who aﬀect the growth rate do this to the same extent, the function
must be linear.
13g = φ + ψM (3.11)
where φ and ψ are positive constants. φ could be viewed as the growth rate
without an education externality and ψ as this positive externality from ed-
ucated individuals. There are three diﬀerent possibilities of the level of M,
depending on how large is ˆ X relative to xL and xH. As could be seen from
equation (3.4), a general feature of these three cases is that xH < xL, since
the consumption value is higher for the H-type individuals.
Case 1. ˆ X < xH < xL
Call the mass of growth aﬀecting individuals in this case M1. Then, M1
are all the educated individuals from both groups. Therefore, all educated
individuals aﬀect the growth rate and so will also students who switch to
education as a response to the introduction of subsidies. Hence, there is no
leakage in the form of subsidies that target individuals which does not aﬀect
the growth rate. The situation can be illustrated with the following ﬁgure:
Figure 1: Ability thresholds for case 1
X
X X X ˆ X xH xL
M1 is all L-individuals with XL > xL and the H-individuals with XH > xH,
that is M1 =
P
j αj(X −xj). Plugging (3.9) into (3.4) and rearranging gives
xj as a function of t. Using this in the equation for M1 gives














Equation (3.12) shows that M1 is decreasing in the education cost and in-
creasing in the consumption values for the two types and the subsidy. This
is because all this has a positive eﬀect on the shares of skilled workers of each
type, and M1 is just the total share of skilled workers.
Case 2. xH < ˆ X < xL
In this case, M2 are all educated individuals from group L and the educated
H-individuals above ˆ X, that is M2 = αL(X − xL) + αH(X − ˆ X). Subsidies
will now lead to a leakage, since the new H-students do not aﬀect the growth
rate. The situation can be illustrated with ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2: Ability thresholds for case 2
X
X X X xH ˆ X xL
With similar calculations as in the ﬁrst case, we have













− αH ˆ X (3.13)
15This expression is similar to that for M1 in equation (3.12), but the second
term is weighted with αL. Moreover, the last term is new. These diﬀerences
are due to the fact that not all educated H-individuals have a suﬃciently
high ability to aﬀect the growth rate.
Case 3. xH < xL < ˆ X
In this case, ˆ X is so high relative to xH and xL that M3 only consists of a
part of the educated individuals of both types, see ﬁgure 3.
Figure 3: Ability thresholds for case 3
X





αj(X − ˆ X) = X − ˆ X (3.14)
Subsidizing education in this case will only be a leakage of resources, since
none of the switching students will aﬀect the growth rate. Obviously, for
given xH, xL and ˆ X, it holds that M1 > M2 > M3.
4 Welfare
Government intervention will always beneﬁt the high-educated individuals
regardless of the magnitude of the growth externality, since they are net
16recipients of the tax and subsidy system. Therefore, in this section, I focus
on the cases when an education subsidy can beneﬁt none, some or all of the
low-educated individuals, respectively. It will beneﬁt some (all) of them if
the positive growth eﬀect is larger than the negative tax eﬀect for some (all)
of them. Consequently, none of them will beneﬁt from the subsidy if the tax
eﬀect outweighs the growth eﬀect for all the low-educated individuals.
Whereas all individuals pay equally large taxes, they beneﬁt to a dif-
ferent extent from an increase in the growth rate. To see this, note that
C = X(1 + g(t)) − t + θj. The larger the ability X, the higher is the posi-
tive eﬀect of the growth externality. Hence, it is not only possible that the
increase in the growth rate is suﬃciently large to make all low-educated in-
dividuals better oﬀ; it could also be the case that only a subset of them are
made better oﬀ. It is also possible that the growth eﬀect is so small that
none of the low-educated individuals beneﬁt from the subsidy. The three




∂t < 1, that is, when the low-educated individual with the highest
ability does not beneﬁt from the subsidy, no low-educated individual will ben-
eﬁt from the subsidy.
2. If X
∂g
∂t < 1 < xL
∂g
∂t, that is, when the low-educated individuals with the
highest ability beneﬁt from the subsidy but the ones with the lowest ability
are worse oﬀ, there exists e X ∈ (X,xL) such that all low-educated individuals
with X > e X beneﬁt from the subsidy and all X < e X are worse oﬀ.
3. If X
∂g
∂t ≥ 1, that is, when the low-educated individuals with the lowest
ability are weakly better oﬀ from the subsidy, all low-educated individuals will
beneﬁt from the subsidy.
17Proof. Follows from the facts that dC
dt = X
∂g
∂t −1, which is increasing in X,
and that xH < xL.￿
As is clear from Proposition 1, Pareto improvement comes down to making
the individuals with the lowest ability better oﬀ. Moreover, the higher is
∂g
∂t, the more unskilled individuals beneﬁt from the subsidy. In the following,
I will assess the magnitude of this derivative and the condition for Pareto
improvement in the diﬀerent cases of M. Before considering cases 1 and 2,
case 3 can be ruled out.
Proposition 2
If M = M3, government intervention cannot be Pareto improving.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that Pareto improvement implies
that X
∂g
∂t ≥ 1. However, increasing the mass of educated individuals does
not increase g in case 3, that is
∂g
∂t = 0.￿
Note that when computing
∂g
∂t, it is convenient to write equation (3.11) as
g = φ + ψM1(t) and g = φ + ψM2(t) using equations (3.12) and (3.13),
respectively. Cases 1 and 2 are now assessed one at a time.











2 . The condition for a Pareto improving







18The intuition is clear. The more additional students that increase the growth
rate (higher ψ) and the more individuals who are attracted by the subsidy
(lower t), the higher is the possibility of the subsidy being Pareto improving.
The last result stems from the fact that d2s
dt2 < 0, see section (3.1). The higher
the tax rate, the lower is the increase in the subsidy on the margin and hence,
the fewer new students are attracted by the increase in the subsidy. There
is also another eﬀect reinforcing the result that the requirements for Pareto
improvements are best fulﬁlled when taxes and subsidies are increased from
a low level.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that as the subsidy is increased, more
individuals choose to obtain an education, which implies that the ”new stu-
dents” have a lower ability than those previously attracted by the subsidy.
This makes the marginal contribution to the growth rate lower as the subsidy
increases. In eﬀect, as t increases, the thresholds of the two types move to
the left and eventually, case 1 turns into case 2. Keeping increasing taxes
and subsidies eventually leads to case 3, where none of the new students have
a suﬃciently high ability to aﬀect the growth rate.











2 . The condition for a Pareto improving















2 . This is because in case 2,
not only more talented L-individuals with a suﬃciently high ability to aﬀect
the growth rate are attracted by the subsidy, but also H-individuals with a
19lower ability than the growth aﬀecting threshold ˆ X. Hence, in addition to
the intuition for case 1, in this case it holds that the higher is the proportion
of L-individuals in the economy, the higher is the possibility of a Pareto
improving subsidy.
Next, we turn to the characterization of the social optimum. Deﬁne an
utilitarian social welfare function SWF, where all variables are expressed as













U(X(1 + k + g(t)) − t + θj − (1 − s(t))R)f(X)dX
#
(4.3)
The social optimum tax rate, denoted t∗, is the solution to
d(SWF(t))
dt = 0. The
model is unrealistic in the sense of government taxation not being distortive.
This has been assumed to highlight the idea of the paper. Introducing a
distortion would change the results in the following way.
First, the conditions for Pareto improvement characterized in equations
(4.1-2) would no longer be suﬃcient, since they only ensure that the positive
growth eﬀect outweighs the negative tax eﬀect. With distortive taxation,
the growth eﬀect would need to be higher to outweigh both the direct eﬀect
of the tax and the distortion eﬀect. Second, the social optimum in the case
with non-distortive taxation would be to let the tax rate be so high that
all individuals choose higher education. In that way, the growth eﬀect is
maximized whereas no redistribution takes place between individuals. The
tax that the individual pays is fully recovered by the subsidy to education.
With distortive taxation, however, this ﬁctitious redistribution can no longer
20take place without a utility loss for the individuals. The social optimum
would therefore be one with both low- and high-educated individuals. The
exact level of the social optimum tax rate would naturally depend on the
utility weight put on each individual - it would be higher (lower) the higher
(lower) is the weight put on high-educated individuals.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper has introduced a heterogeneous consumption value of education
and an endogenous growth mechanism, where the educated individuals’ eﬀect
on the growth rate depends on their ability. With this framework, unskilled
individuals will be willing to contribute to ﬁnancing the education of skilled
individuals, only if suﬃciently able individuals choose to get an education
as a response to the introduction of (increase in) the subsidy, and if their
eﬀect on the general growth rate is suﬃciently large. This is in contrast with
earlier literature where it is always assumed that the individuals that choose
higher education are those with the highest ability.
Naturally, the model is very stylized and abstracts from several complex-
ities. Nevertheless, it contains mechanisms and components with points of
contact to real world educational reforms and policy discussions. For ex-
ample, the reform conducted in Sweden in the 50’s that was discussed in
Section 2 may not only have had equality considerations and consequences.
Incorporating individuals with unskilled parents into higher education may
be a way of ensuring that there are high-ability individuals contributing to
the human capital formation in a country. Hence, in an endogenous growth
framework, this may also have positive eﬃciency eﬀects.
As discussed earlier, a crucial assumption in this paper is that of the
heterogeneous consumption value of education between individuals of diﬀer-
ent socioeconomic backgrounds. Naturally, if the consumption value were
identical in these diﬀerent types of backgrounds, the individuals’ ability en-
21dowment would determine the education decision to a greater extent. Hence,
a policy recommendation would be that policy interventions should be ad-
dressed at a very early age, before the consumption value of education is
formed, in order to narrow the distribution of consumption values. This con-
clusion is much in line with the proposals in Heckman and Carneiro (2003)
and Krueger (2003). On the other hand, if the diﬀerences in consumption
value persist, non-eﬃcient enrollment to higher education may be mitigated
by introducing a subsidy scheme encouraging people from less advanced fam-
ilies to enroll in higher education.
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